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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, securities fraud class action settlements produced $5.45 billion in
cash to be distributed to defrauded investors.1 Institutional investors own the
lion’s share of the publicly traded equity securities in this country and therefore
were entitled to collect most of that money by simply filing relatively simple
claims forms documenting their trading during the class period. Those
institutions that chose to do so recouped large sums of money for their
beneficiaries.2
However, in a pilot study we published two years ago, we reported that
nearly two-thirds of the institutional investors with financial losses in fiftythree settled securities class actions failed to submit claims. As a consequence
of this failure, substantial sums that they were entitled to receive were given to
others.3 Using some back-of-the-envelope calculations, one commentator
analyzing our results suggested that each year slightly more than $1 billion is
left on the settlement table by nonfiling financial institutions.4 Because we had
a small sample of settlements in our study, we could only reach tentative
conclusions about the extent of the problem. The pilot study nonetheless
portended several disturbing policy implications for securities class actions.
This Article presents the results of a much more extensive investigation of
the frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled
securities class actions. We combine both an empirical study of a large set of
settlements and the results of a survey of institutional investors about their
claims filing practices. Our sample for the first part of the analysis contains 118

1. Inst’l Shareholder Servs., Final Settlements for 2004, http://scas. issproxy.com/
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005); see also Barry B. Burr, More Money: $5.5 Billion Up for Taking
from Securities Litigation, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 18, 2004, at 4; Mark Jaffe,
Investors Often Don’t File Claims: Shareholder’s Lawsuits Generate Settlements for
Everyone, PHILA. INQ., Dec. 27, 2003, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/
business/7577675.htm.
2. For instance, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board has recovered an average of
$7 million annually over the past several years because it pursued such claims. Jaffe, supra
note 1.
3. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do
Institutional Investors Fail To File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.
855 (2002).
4. See A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883 (2002).
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settlements that were not included in our earlier study.5 The number of
settlements examined in this study is, therefore, more than twice as many as we
earlier examined. We find that less than thirty percent of institutional investors
with provable losses perfect their claims in these settlements.6
We then explore the possible explanations for this widespread failure. We
suggest a wide range of potential problems, from mechanical failures in the
notification and recordkeeping processes to more subtle issues such as portfolio
managers’ beliefs that only investment activities produce significant returns for
their clients.
In order to determine which of these problems were the main culprits, we
surveyed institutional investors about their claims filing practices, asking them
who was responsible for this task, how they performed it, and what, if any,
performance monitoring was done. We learned that most institutions relied on
their custodian banks to file claims for them in securities fraud class action
settlements, that many of these institutions did little monitoring of whether the
custodian actually performed these services, and that custodians had financial
disincentives to file claims on behalf of their clients. Nevertheless, virtually
every respondent reported that their institution filed claims in all settlements in
which it was a class member. Our respondents also identified a number of
problems with the claims filing process, including difficulties in learning about
settlements, monitoring claims, gathering and compiling information necessary
to complete claims, and accounting for payments made after they are received.
Accepting for the moment our empirical findings that many institutions
have failed to file claims, should their trustees be liable for this failure? What
about their custodian banks that agreed to make these claims for the
institutions? If so, what is the appropriate standard of liability that we should
apply in this situation? We argue that any such failures should be evaluated as
potential breaches of the duty of care consistent with the now invigorated
monitoring obligations embraced in Delaware’s Caremark decision.7 Applying
this standard to our problem, we believe that the trustees of institutional
investors must, in good faith, insure that their fund has an adequate system in
place to identify and process the fund’s claims. As developed later in this
Article, we conclude that Caremark requires institutions to create a monitoring
mechanism to insure that this system is adequate, and if they learn it is
inadequate, they should take measures to fix the problem. The obligations of
the institution’s custodians or other vendors are also examined.
5. These cases were not included in our earlier study because, at that time, we had not
received all of the data that we needed from the claims administrator who was providing
them. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 874.
6. European investors in American companies have also been reported to be deficient
in filing claims in securities fraud class actions. Sundeep Tucker, Investors Miss Out on US
Pay-Outs, FIN. TIMES (London), May 19, 2005, at 27 (estimating that these investors failed to
collect $2.4 billion awarded to them in securities fraud class action settlements).
7. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Turning to the even broader policy implications of our findings, we
identify several discrete problems that can be addressed to help remedy the
current situation. First, we believe that the federal courts should create a
centralized information clearinghouse or website for settlement notices, claims
forms, and other information about securities fraud class action settlements.
This information resource would greatly facilitate institutions’ learning about
settlements and obtaining the materials that they need to file claims. Our first
recommendation should also help to improve monitoring by the institutions
themselves or, alternatively, to encourage institutions to hire third-party claims
monitoring services. Second, the federal courts could also mandate the creation
and usage of standardized claims forms and trading documentation. Again, this
would facilitate the claims filing process. Third, we think that institutional
investors that contract with their custodians to handle their claims filing need to
improve their monitoring of the process. Fourth, we believe that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) should strengthen its information gathering
from institutional investors under Securities Exchange Act Section 13(f) so as
to make that information both more transparent (e.g., identify beneficial owners
of shares when filing on behalf of another) and easily searchable. Finally, we
believe that government regulators should establish clear guidelines concerning
claims filing practices and duties for fiduciaries.
We conclude our Article with two observations about the implications of
our results for the goals of securities fraud litigation. Our first point builds off
our survey respondents’ statements that they do not allocate any recoveries they
receive to the individual fund beneficiaries but instead to the fund suffering the
loss or, in some cases, to the institutional investors’ general fund. Our survey,
therefore, reflects a serious mismatch between the beneficiaries of the
settlement and those who have been harmed by the securities violation that
gave rise to the settlement in the first place. Simply stated, many defrauded
beneficiaries are not compensated for their losses, while others are unjustly
enriched. Given the enormous importance of institutional investors in the
market, this mismatch raises serious doubts about whether securities fraud class
actions can be justified as compensatory mechanisms. Moreover, the poor
claims filing records of institutional investors exacerbate this mismatch, as
many investors are systematically deprived of any benefits from these
settlements. This fact raises more doubts about the compensatory function of
securities fraud cases.
Consequently, we believe the more persuasive rationale for these cases is
the deterrence of fraud. But, in order to accomplish that purpose, the current
process needs to undergo some changes. We therefore suggest targeting
securities fraud litigation at the individual wrongdoers’ level and invoking
vicarious liability only when the company benefits from the fraud.
Our second concluding point is that it matters whether institutional
investors file claims, for two reasons. First, pension fund trustees should be
required to take actions to maximize the value of the assets under their
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management, such as filing cost-justified claims in securities fraud class action
settlements, even if these actions do not create “big money.” Using any other
legal standard for trustees’ fiduciary duties diminishes the value of the duty of
care. Second, if institutions are active participants in the settlement process,
they will press for changes in the current system and help bring about needed
reforms.
The organization of this Article is straightforward. Part I provides a
description of the legal and institutional environment within which securities
class actions thrive. In Part II, we describe our database, the methodology
employed, and the results of our study of 118 settlements. The potentially
numerous explanations of why so many financial institutions fail to participate
in class action settlements are developed in Part III, and in Part IV, we use our
survey of financial institutions to isolate the likely reasons that financial
institutions are so frequently missing from the line of claimants that forms at
the end of securities class actions. In Part V, we examine the legal standards
that ought to be applied to determine whether pension fund trustees and
custodian banks that fail to file are liable for their failure and, if so, what the
damages ought to be. In Part VI, we propose five easy steps to help ensure that
institutions receive their fair share of settlement awards. In Part VII, we discuss
two concluding policy implications of our empirical findings and survey
results.
I. THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT ENVIRONMENT
Financial institutions include private and public pension funds, life and
casualty insurance companies, mutual funds, bank trust departments, and
various endowments. While each owes its existence to a different source of
funding than the others (insurance companies derive their funding from policy
premiums and endowments from munificence), all such financial institutions
share a common bond: wise stewardship of the portfolio managed by each
financial institution redounds to the benefit of another, be that person a
pensioner, policyholder, stockholder, beneficiary, or even a faculty member.
For this reason, the managers of each type of financial institution are subject to
variously expressed fiduciary obligations that compel their prudent stewardship
of their portfolio.
From a different perspective, we can identify financial institutions as
perhaps the single most important group of investors when designing securities
regulatory policies. Financial institutions own slightly less than one-half of all
equity securities,8 and more importantly, from the perspective of securities

8. At the close of the third quarter of 2002, financial institutions held 49.8% of all
publicly traded equities. See NYSE Fact Book Online, Holdings of Corporate Equities in the
U.S. by Type of Institution, http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/vieweredition.asp?mode=
table&key=2673&category=12 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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policymaking, their trading dominates, in terms of both dollar and share
volume, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as well as the large
capitalization stocks listed on Nasdaq.9 Even though we might conclude that
retail investors are also important because they provide additional depth to the
trading on the securities markets, it is the financial institutions whose larger
trades and greater frequency of trading “make” prices.10 The regulatory
implications of institutional forces in trading markets are broadly evident, the
most dramatic being the architecture of the current disclosure mechanisms for
public offerings, where we find a healthy respect on the part of the SEC for the
impact financial institutions have on the operation of our securities markets.11
Reform efforts since then have also focused on the presence or absence of
institutional investors.12
Reform efforts for securities class actions complement the potential role of
financial institutions. A major innovation of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)13 is the “lead plaintiff” provision.14 To

9. One of the best indications of the overall volume of institutional trading is the data
regarding “block” trades (i.e., trades of at least 10,000 shares of an individual stock). For
2005 (as of October 2005), block trades represented approximately 26% of total trading
volume on the NYSE. NYSE Monthly Block Volume, Block Volume Last 12 Months,
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/datalib/1022743347436.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
In the Nasdaq National Markets, block trades represented almost 20% of total share volume
during the period between October 2004 and October 2005. Nasdaq Trader,
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/asp/tdMarkSpec.asp?RepType=3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
10. See Eric C. Otness, Comment, Balancing the Interests of Retail and Institutional
Investors: The Continued Quest for Transparency in Today’s Fragmented Equity Markets,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1616 (2002) (“[E]xecuting an order to buy or sell a large number of
shares may signal the market of the investors’ intent and, accordingly, drive prices up, in the
case of a buy order, or down, in the case of a sell order.”); see also DONALD CASSIDY,
TRADING ON VOLUME: THE KEY TO IDENTIFYING AND PROFITING FROM STOCK PRICE
REVERSALS 290 (2002) (explaining that the large trading volume of institutional investors in
the market place combined with their tendency to act alike at critical moments sharply
increases market volatility).
11. The SEC’s integrated disclosure procedures and shelf registration process are
heavily dependent on the view that the securities of companies eligible to use the integrated
disclosure system are traded in an efficient market, and this view, in part, rests upon a belief
that institutional investors are both significant traders and owners of such securities. See
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383 (Mar. 3,
1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 11,819 (Mar. 19, 1982); Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter,
Measuring Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105, 109 (2000).
12. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 855 (explaining that the significant trading and
ownership interest of institutional investors is the focus of the questions about the scope of
nonpublic offerings and about making the corporation more responsive to owners).
13. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
14. The literature on lead plaintiffs is now fairly extensive. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey,
Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary
Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239; Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other
Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 53 (2001); R. Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing
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overcome the concern that securities class actions are “lawyer driven” because
they are missing an engaged client who can supervise the action’s attorney, the
PSLRA amended the securities laws to require that, within twenty days of
filing, the complaint notice must be published inviting members of the class to
apply to become the suit’s representative. From those who apply to be the lead
plaintiff, the PSLRA’s reforms call for the court to appoint the “most adequate
representative,” who is identified by the legislation as the claimant with “the
largest financial interest” in the suit.15 The assumption underlying the lead
plaintiff provision is that an investor with a sufficiently large financial stake in
the suit will be a more diligent monitor than a person with a miniscule claim in
the suit who may well even have been selected by the suit’s attorney.16 The
PSLRA tasks the lead plaintiff to select counsel for the suit, albeit subject to
approval of the court.17 The overall objective of the lead plaintiff provision is
well understood: harnessing the economic self-interest of a class action member
to the suit’s attorney. Given the dominance and size of trades by financial
institutions, we frequently find financial institutions petitioning and being
chosen to be lead plaintiffs.
The class action lawyers are not neutral regarding which applicant the
court selects as the lead plaintiff. When there are competing lead plaintiffs, as
there frequently are, the selection of lead plaintiff is truly a surrogate means of
determining which competing firm will be lead, or increasingly co-lead,
counsel for the class action. Absent such designation, the class action attorney
assumes the underplayed position of the Maytag repairman. For this reason,
there is abundant evidence of alliances formed among once-competing law
firms, whereby they bundle their clients together so that, combined, they
possess the investors with the “largest financial interest.”18
Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199
(1999).
15. The overall strength of the presumption that the petitioning claimant with the
largest loss is the most adequate plaintiff is evident by the fact that the presumption can only
be overcome by proof that the petitioner will not adequately represent the class or “is subject
to unique defenses.” Securities Exchange Act § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i-iii)
(2005).
16. Congress’s consideration of improving the oversight of the class action’s attorney
coincided with an important study by Professors Weiss and Beckerman, whose data
revealed, among other interesting facts, that the fifty largest claimants in eighty-two studied
class action settlements had an average allowable loss of $597,000. Elliot J. Weiss & John S.
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2089-90 (1995) (stating that
the fifty largest claimants accounted for an average of 57.5% of all allowable losses among
claimants).
17. See Securities Act § 27(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3) (2005); Securities Exchange
Act § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2005) (detailing procedures for the appointment
of the most adequate plaintiff and describing the powers of the person so selected).
18. The lead plaintiff provision provides that the plaintiff or plaintiffs with the largest
allowable loss is/are presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff(s). This presumption does
not require that the lead plaintiff be a single investor because the statute permits, and
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Settlements are the end game for securities class action suits. Even though
several hundred securities class actions are settled annually, fewer than one or
two securities class action suits are tried in any year. Before the enactment of
the PSLRA, because trials were infrequent, there was cause to fear that no
effective check existed on the litigants to be sure that the litigation was either
well intentioned or that its settlement reached a justifiable conclusion.19 This
problem occurred because the plaintiff too frequently was a mere figurehead
who lacked any effective control over the suit, and the class action attorney was
preoccupied with her prospective fee. To be sure, no settlement or dismissal of
a class action can occur without the approval of the court. However, the court is
also conflicted by a concern for its docket and suffers from a heavy dependence
on the suit’s attorneys for their justifications for the settlement agreement.20
A major reason for the lead plaintiff provision’s incorporation into the
PSLRA is to introduce a self-interested investor-based perspective into the
litigation and, ultimately, into the settlement process. Absent a real plaintiff, the
well-recognized concern is that the class action’s counsel’s natural incentive is
to settle the case for too little recovery on the part of the class members.21 Lead
plaintiffs were also seen as a reliable governor on the continuance of the suit
when the facts indicated that the suit was improvidently initiated. Despite these
lofty visions of the lead plaintiff, there continues to be cause to wonder if the
lead plaintiff has met its full anticipated potential. For example, there is little
evidence of lead plaintiffs moving to dismiss a class action suit. Their
involvement is limited to anointing a firm as lead counsel for the suit.
The true battleground for securities class action litigation is the pretrial
motions. The most serious obstacle confronting the class action is withstanding
attorneys frequently advance, aggregation of diverse investors who collectively are “the lead
plaintiff.” See Heck, supra note 14. For an interesting illustration and discussion of the
tournament and alliances that arise among competing counsel, see In re Razorfish, Inc., 143
F. Supp. 2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reviewing efforts of several law firms to “cobble”
together a diverse group of investors so as to have a client with the largest allowable loss).
19. The literature concerning the weak incentives for all the participants in class
actions is extensive. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983)
[hereinafter Coffee, Bounty Hunter]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action
Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1991); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (1993); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling
Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2000).
20. Consider the candor of one federal judge who remarked, “[T]he court starts from
the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.” In re
Warner Commc’ns, 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1986).
21. For a close analysis of this problem, see Coffee, Bounty Hunter, supra note 19.
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the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The PSLRA abandoned nearly a half century
of notice pleading under the federal rules and substituted a requirement that the
complaint not only plead facts with particularity, but also, with respect to any
action involving an allegation of fraud, that the complaint’s facts create a
“strong inference” of a violation.22 This heightened pleading requirement is
coupled with another PSLRA reform—the denial of discovery until all pretrial
motions have been resolved.23 Hence, the facts needed to establish a strong
inference of fraud must come from sources quite independent of the plaintiffs’
lawyer perusing the defendants’ records. Once the complaint has crossed the
heightened pleading requirement, however, the air is ripe with the odor of
settlement. There is little for either side to gain by proceeding to trial, and the
risks to the contingency-fee attorney of proceeding and losing dominate
whatever optimism she has for how the facts will play to a jury. Thus, we find
few trials of securities cases. Settlement is the norm.
Disbursements from the settlement are carried out by the claims
administrator who is either appointed by the court or simply retained by the
suit’s attorneys. The most substantial efforts of the claims administrator are
collecting and reviewing the proof of claims submitted to her. But, before
receiving such submissions, the claims administrator engages in a good many
steps designed to give notice of the settlement. Because of the way in which
stocks are both owned and traded, the claims administrator faces multiple
challenges in assuring that potential claimants in fact receive notice of the
settlement.
In the abstract, it is logical to begin the process of identifying possible
claimants by obtaining from the issuer’s transfer agent a list of the security’s
registered holders. However, because most investors hold their securities in
street names, the list, in most instances, reports that ownership is with CEDE &
Co., the depositary for most brokers. Even acquiring this information is
problematic in the case of a bankrupt issuer or when, through merger or
otherwise, the issuer has ceased to exist, which is frequently the case in settled
securities class actions. When the issuer continues to exist, the claims
administrator must penetrate the CEDE listing using the DTC Participant List, a
database of over 2000 brokers that participate in the Depositary Trust
Company. Using this database, the claims administrator sends notices of the
settlement to brokers, asking each broker to assist in identifying customers it
believes may be included within the settlement.24 The brokerage firms

22. The heightened pleading requirement applies only to claims involving allegations
of a violation that has as one of its elements a state of mind on the part of the defendant (e.g.,
not a violation that can arise from mere negligence). See Securities Exchange Act
§ 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2005).
23. See Securities Act § 27(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77z(b)(1); Securities Exchange Act
§ 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
24. The description of the steps taken by settlement and claims administrators to
identify potential claimants is the result of numerous conversations we have had with several
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customarily cooperate, either by returning to the claims administrator printed or
electronic versions of customers’ addresses or labels with the customers’
addresses. A few brokers prefer not to share the customer addresses, so they
obtain from the claims administrator a sufficient quantity of settlement notices
and forward them directly to the appropriate customers.
During this process, potential institutional claimants are even less visible.
Trading and ownership by institutions is usually much less transparent than that
of the typical retail investor. This pattern occurs in part because institutions,
particularly mutual and hedge funds, value trading anonymity more so than do
retail customers (due to the size of their holdings in individual companies).
More frequently, though, the problem of identifying institutions results from
their reliance on an extensive network of advisors who execute trades through
brokers in the advisor’s name and not in the name of the institution. Simply
stated, with the institution, there is generally introduced yet another layer of
market professionals whose goodwill and cooperation are needed for the
settlement notice to reach the ultimate beneficiary of the settlement.
To be sure, just as the broker is under a duty to forward the settlement
notice to its customers whose share ownership is recorded in street name, the
advisor has a similar obligation to forward the notice to its institutional client.
But, this web of obligations is far from certain in its ultimate effect of
imparting notice to the institution. Thus, a further step taken by claims
administrators is publishing notice in the national financial press, such as The
Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and Investors Business Daily. Furthermore,
other services exist that advertise class action settlements. For example, our
survey revealed that many institutions learned of the suit and settlement
through their subscription to Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS)
Securities Class Action Services. We were also advised that some law firms
provide these services to institutional investors, perhaps in hopes of gaining
their future business. There are also independent third-party claims advisory
services that search for such notices on behalf of their clients.
II. SETTLEMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
In order to obtain a sample of securities fraud settlements, we asked three
settlement administrators to help us identify a group of securities fraud class
action settlements and provide us with the settlement notices from these
cases.25 We used these notices to gather a wide variety of information about
administrators, as well as an examination of public filings related to settled class actions
where administrators detail their efforts. See, e.g., Affidavit of Brian Burke, In re Health
Mgmt. Systems Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Affidavit of Ellen
Riley, Alpern v. Utilicorp United Inc., 84 F.3d 1525 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Affidavit of G. Peter
Buchband, State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Goldfield (N.D. Tex. 1999) (affidavits on file with
authors).
25. A more detailed explanation of our methodology is found in Cox & Thomas, supra
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these cases, including the identity of the lead plaintiff for post-PSLRA cases
and the class period for each case.
We then generated two additional types of data. First, for each settlement
in our sample, we used SEC Form 13F26 data to determine which institutions
traded stock in the company during the class period. After we generated this list
of the institutional investors, we compared it with our claims data to see if these
institutions filed claims in the securities class action settlements. In our earlier
work, we set forth the results of this comparison for the relatively small number
of cases that we obtained from two of the three claims administrators.
In this Article, we present the results for the much larger sample that we
received from Claims Administrator Three. All settlements listed here involved
purchaser classes. As before, we create a list of Form 13F filers that reported
purchases during the sample period and compare it with the names of the
beneficial owners that filed claims in the settlement. Using the results of this
comparison, we calculate the percentage of Form 13F traders that file claims in
each settlement.
Table 1 sets forth this information by sample company, as well as data on
the average, median, minimum, and maximum size of the claim for each
institution that filed a claim. We note that we have incomplete information on
several of the settlements (indicated by the letters NA, and in such instances,
they are not included in the totals for any of the columns).
Table 1. Claims Administrator Three Data on Settlements; 13F Data on Filing
Case

No.
Filing

No.
Trading

Percent
Filing

Mean
Loss

Median
Loss

Minimum
Loss

Maximum
Loss

1

87

240

36.25%

1,938,373

2

5

22

22.73%

802,682

239,274

11,907

33,289,462

473,280

22,943

3

5

19

26.32%

798,489

302,572

1,808,569

11,940

2,079,067

4

25

83

30.12%

318,412

122,539

10,058

2,327,380

5

76

191

39.79%

427,208

130,981

13,125

8,014,688

6

45

169

26.63%

270,952

92,055

11,400

2,925,315

7

30

137

21.90%

398,678

40,508

11,700

8,286,060

8

3

20

15.00%

388,944

105,230

33,962

1,027,641

9

75

206

36.41%

2,013,118

412,937

10,200

60,367,425

10

51

348

14.66%

1,154,575

127,603

11,768

32,526,854

11

54

134

40.30%

1,539,851

452,786

10,315

23,312,885

12

36

92

39.13%

2,643,492

80,794

11,625

64,772,109

13

10

21

47.62%

278,114

250,133

12,649

670,611

note 3, at 871-74.
26. Both Securities Exchange Act § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2005) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13f-1 (2005) require institutional investment managers who have at least $100 million
to file Form 13F within forty-five days of each fiscal quarter detailing the holdings of certain
equities (i.e., those subject to the early warning provision of section 13(d)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2005)).
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10

28

35.71%

654,397

291,906
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24,400

2,719,875

15

9

26

34.62%

1,042,362

278,322

15,100

7,175,025

16

70

236

29.66%

996,198

174,944

10,604

13,204,931

17

22

41

53.66%

973,664

519,792

12,506

5,525,283

18

51

142

35.92%

914,650

102,951

13,722

16,448,536

19

10

145

6.90%

156,530

73,245

14,900

604,632

20

69

145

47.59%

731,021

194,130

15,840

11,708,774

21

16

46

34.78%

356,911

268,349

22,863

1,222,040

22

8

47

17.02%

39,886

33,195

10,600

91,729

23

24

69

34.78%

1,097,354

358,055

14,383

6,208,669

24

17

48

35.42%

1,968,882

467,362

12,980

12,714,092

25

15

51

29.41%

1,103,994

275,298

13,283

12,409,544

26

21

82

25.61%

228,325

75,353

10,603

2,089,880

27

45

117

38.46%

1,504,321

197,746

10,363

14,799,408

28

9

62

14.52%

230,788

155,844

52,500

489,225

29

14

69

20.29%

273,330

86,388

11,625

1,714,650

30

12

47

25.53%

259,980

98,796

10,751

1,229,699

31

35

116

30.17%

1,803,769

482,900

25,594

35,953,038

32

12

80

15.00%

122,245

50,813

10,000

710,500

33

16

43

37.21%

1,017,996

175,621

11,790

4,338,355

34

15

60

25.00%

306,287

112,375

10,150

1,012,704

35

32

138

23.19%

722,891

174,839

10,500

5,889,279

36

25

145

17.24%

199,067

118,472

10,075

799,955

37

40

90

44.44%

1,323,568

546,197

27,171

11,231,263

38

3

24

12.50%

96,708

78,023

13,484

198,617

39

10

40

25.00%

252,150

220,834

21,095

830,332

40

21

77

27.27%

305,215

153,750

10,589

1,127,500

41

2

16

12.50%

46,202

46,202

37,699

54,705

42

40

85

47.06%

995,358

419,912

11,898

7,775,718

43

73

198

36.87%

465,905

105,750

10,363

9,438,575

44

45

91

49.45%

858,625

237,500

12,625

12,679,950

45

58

162

35.80%

1,633,779

349,323

10,500

26,700,814

46

31

93

33.33%

647,646

138,443

12,512

6,675,624

47

17

51

33.33%

447,146

127,600

15,990

3,500,000

48

26

56

46.43%

875,682

559,122

18,998

4,804,085

49

2

15

13.33%

70,044

70,044

17,588

122,500

50

16

131

12.21%

385,371

168,393

12,275

1,787,270

51

16

49

32.65%

898,633

369,257

19,793

4,098,965

52

9

21

42.86%

384,100

197,148

22,863

990,039

53

17

44

38.64%

854,210

788,832

17,432

2,139,050

54

14

37

37.84%

997,459

721,925

26,161

2,780,042

55

57

126

45.24%

1,762,263

495,891

10,544

18,404,236

56

14

57

24.56%

708,137

272,353

14,230

3,313,173
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57

0

3

0.00%

NA

58

16

78

20.51%

313,450

231,645

17,550

955,404

59

1

11

9.09%

207,000

207,000

207,000

207,000

60

17

48

35.42%

726,707

243,771

26,478

3,211,050

61

5

13

38.46%

472,613

554,625

18,275

850,000

62

14

44

31.82%

826,697

267,413

71,363

4,828,552

63

21

65

32.31%

1,376,085

373,171

15,757

21,477,801

64

20

53

37.74%

631,615

292,957

14,165

3,065,586

65

41

91

45.06%

2,649,033

610,400

12,315

55,306,114

66

26

76

34.21%

1,049,458

154,814

12,028

10,128,841

67

49

128

38.28%

694,324

157,825

10,680

5,155,358

68

3

19

15.79%

465,589

252,939

228,014

915,813

69

4

21

19.05%

99,941

91,394

11,651

205,325

70

45

107

42.06%

2,005,097

662,093

12,463

12,940,277

71

132

245

53.88%

5,541,965

633,915

10,123

155,885,624

72

3

22

13.64%

464,578

100,942

50,132

1,242,660

73

13

44

29.55%

733,225

152,580

11,348

6,018,931

74

0

22

0.00%

NA

NA

NA

NA

75

1

12

8.33%

10,500

10,500

10,500

10,500

76

11

35

31.43%

112,005

70,750

16,320

309,955

77

17

38

44.74%

916,865

280,955

54,375

4,795,292

78

2

29

6.90%

754,340

754,340

89,902

1,418,778

79

2

29

6.90%

259,461

259,461

43,247

475,674

80

24

84

28.57%

285,032

87,245

10,253

2,344,929

81

24

74

32.43%

685,447

176,031

11,905

6,043,538

82

1

18

5.56%

31,075

31,075

31,075

31,075

83

1

16

6.25%

2,622,923

2,622,923

2,622,923

2,622,923

84

11

51

21.57%

109,288

46,394

14,714

313,981

85

44

143

30.77%

2,066,510

142,664

11,613

67,291,180

86

13

36

36.11%

133,386

102,664

41,938

370,156

87

2

11

18.18%

459,162

459,162

85,779

832,545

88

27

99

27.27%

618,554

323,388

14,632

7,066,264

89

4

27

14.82%

161,922

147,813

51,063

301,000

90

37

163

22.70%

336,473

109,058

10,863

4,246,474
11,399,104

91

19

56

33.93%

1,078,353

253,754

15,054

92

41

144

28.47%

387,208

125,450

13,050

7,428,200

93

17

33

51.52%

1,057,035

345,039

26,853

4,317,676

94

0

9

0.00%

NA

NA

NA

NA

95

42

110

38.18%

2,989,015

387,642

11,450

49,066,864

96

5

27

18.52%

376,590

163,013

68,850

980,988

97

95

213

44.60%

684,700

237,607

11,122

9,373,186

98

42

108

38.89%

4,962,839

633,925

15,181

75,226,325

99

8

18

44.44%

159,531

102,173

13,570

445,963
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100

22

74

29.73%

1,195,357

221,113

19,600

6,651,309

101

25

58

43.10%

1,259,327

308,997

14,733

9,679,460

102

12

67

17.91%

288,193

40,875

13,500

2,593,563

103

11

78

14.10%

184,232

92,098

21,306

482,720

104

21

63

33.33%

2,244,347

1,061,877

15,785

19,342,542

105

21

89

23.60%

351,910

60,500

14,400

3,384,000

106

21

89

23.60%

557,668

206,185

15,070

2,262,413

107

16

52

30.77%

1,538,348

1,309,047

13,294

4,527,484

108

6

37

16.22%

239,140

184,793

48,750

738,745

109

0

7

0.00%

NA

NA

NA

NA

110

47

116

40.52%

474,472

164,947

10,500

7,066,611

111

31

99

31.31%

509,413

224,037

10,117

3,839,542

112

36

139

25.90%

453,745

105,296

11,680

3,701,560

113

10

44

22.73%

411,550

180,846

31,150

2,718,405

114

11

44

25.00%

1,973,029

392,312

26,664

7,123,741

115

44

118

37.29%

600,364

191,940

13,649

6,514,878

116

10

39

25.64%

1,051,964

174,585

13,287

9,001,675

117

1

7

14.29%

137,955

137,955

137,955

137,955

118

2

35

5.71%

42,336

42,336

32,620

52,052

Total

2,817

9,056

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Mean

24

77

28.09%

848,376

277,405

47,124

10,070,578

Median

17

58

29.70%

625,085

193,035

13,685

3,600,780

Min.

0

3

0.00%

10,500

10,500

10,000

10,500

Max.

132

348

53.88%

5,541,965

2,622,923

2,622,923

155,885,624

Several key points emerge from these data. First, on average, roughly 28%
of eligible institutional investors file claims in these settlements. The median
value is almost identical at 29.7%. This value falls squarely within the 25% to
33% range that we found in our earlier research.
The average mean loss is very substantial in these cases: almost $850,000.
This amount is substantially higher than the average loss of the two samples we
previously analyzed (the first group had an average loss of $102,644, while the
second set showed average losses of $461,074). This difference indicates that
our results are robust even in a sample of significantly larger settlements. We
also present data on median settlement values. We find that the average median
loss is roughly $275,000, which is substantially lower than the almost $850,000
average value reported in Table 1. Nevertheless, even the median loss is a large
number that would seem to indicate that many institutions have suffered
significant losses in these cases.
Of course, what most likely should guide the decision whether to file a
claim is not the loss suffered, but the recovery expected. Here, we can only
draw on our earlier data for a small sample of cases, which show that average
recovery rates are about one-third of losses. Applying this value to the numbers
shown in the previous paragraph would give an average mean recovery of
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around $280,000, or an average median recovery of more than $90,000. To our
eyes, this amount would seem to be a significant return on the small costs (in
terms of time and money) of filing a claim in a securities fraud class action
settlement. We would again (as in our earlier work) caution against putting too
much stock in the precise numbers, but we do think that they indicate that there
is a substantial return to filing claims and a large number of nonfiling
institutions. Of course, the institutions with the largest holdings would realize
far greater returns from filing claims.
Thus, our data provide an inescapable and startling conclusion: Financial
institutions with significant provable losses fail at an alarming rate
(approximately seventy percent) to submit their claims in settled securities class
actions. Moreover, not only are their losses significant, but the sums of money
they likely would gain by filing claims are also not trivial, both in the aggregate
and on an average individual fund basis.
III. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR SLUMBERING
No doubt there are multiple explanations why institutions have such a
dismal record for submitting their claims in settled securities class actions. Our
conversations with participants in the process and theory are the basis for us to
formulate several hypotheses which we develop below.
A. Sleeping with the Enemy
The agency cost implicit in business organizations is well understood.
Because managers seek to maximize their own utility, their actions do not
always redound to the benefit of the firm’s owners or to the benefit of others
for whom the managers are stewards of assets that are not owned by the
managers. Indeed, managers, because they typically own a small percentage of
the firm, have a natural incentive to pursue strategies that benefit themselves
disproportionately vis-à-vis the firm’s owners. Agency costs are not confined to
smokestack industries. They persist across all organization forms, including
financial service firms such as trusts, endowments, and mutual funds.27
27. This topic has been best explored in the context of whether financial institutions
are likely to play a significant role in the governance of their portfolio companies. See, e.g.,
Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1135 (1991) (reviewing the changing role of institutional investors and suggesting that
they are poised to improve corporate performance through their impact on the composition
and processes followed by boards of directors); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) [hereinafter
Black, Agents Watching Agents] (examining a variety of regulatory and cultural forces that
impact the ability of various types of financial institutions to monitor the stewardship of their
portfolio companies); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined] (examining, among
other things, the various conflicts of interest that different types of financial institutions face
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Over the last decade, regulatory efforts have sought to unleash the
disciplining force of financial institutions to improve the stewardship of
corporate managers. The thesis of these reforms is that financial institutions,
because of their significant ownership interest and financial acumen, can be
expected to be vigilant and responsible monitors of managers. Thus, in 1992,
the SEC greatly liberalized the proxy rules to permit financial institutions not
only to announce their positions on matters submitted to the stockholders, but
also to encourage other financial institutions to follow a common course in
voting their proxies.28 The SEC abbreviated the disclosures that are required
for significant holders of publicly traded shares as well, thus reducing some
regulatory friction facing institutions that wish to hold more than five percent
of a firm’s voting shares but do not seek to control that firm.29
More recently, the SEC mandated that mutual funds disclose annually how
they vote their fund’s proxies on matters coming before the shareholders of
their portfolio companies.30 The aspiration for this development is not so much
to assure that the advisor votes in the elections conducted by portfolio

that interfere with their being an effective monitor of managers); Bernard S. Black, The
Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895
(1992) (finding from a review of diverse empirical studies that there is a need for a strong
shareholder voice to address problems such as excess cash accumulations, harmful
acquisition strategies, and excessive executive compensation, but not addressing whether
institutional investors can be expected to effectively provide that voice); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1277 (1991) (arguing that institutions’ preference for liquidity and access to insiders
restricts their willingness to involve themselves as monitors); Edward B. Rock, The Logic
and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991)
(arguing that effective monitoring by institutional investors, while promising, is hampered
by substantial agency costs).
28. “The amendments eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the exchange of
views and opinions by shareholders and others concerning management performance and
initiatives presented for a vote of shareholders.” Regulation of Communications Among
Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992)
(amending proxy rules promulgated under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)
(2005), to exclude from the definition of “proxy solicitation” a security holder’s public
announcement of how he or she intends to vote, and amending 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) to
state that any communication by or on behalf of any person who does not seek the power to
act as proxy is exempt from the proxy regulations). The literature on the 1992 Proxy
Amendments is extensive. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The
Case for Proxy Reform, 17 J. CORP. L. 49 (1991); Joseph Evan Calio & Rafael Xavier
Zahralddin, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions
of Accountability, 14 PACE L. REV. 459 (1994); Norma M. Sharara & Anne E. HokeWitherspoon, The Evolution of the 1992 Shareholder Communication Proxy Rules and Their
Impact on Corporate Governance, 49 BUS. LAW. 327 (1993); Jill A. Hornstein, Note, Proxy
Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate
Governance, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (1993).
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b) (2005).
30. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8188 (Jan. 31, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm.
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companies but rather that, when exercising this franchise, they do so with a
regard for the interests of the fund’s holders.31 That is, the regulatory objective
is the belief that greater transparency is more likely to align the advisor’s
voting decisions with those of the fund’s beneficiaries. Implicit in this
aspiration is the belief that advisors are likely to march to a quite different beat
than do the fund’s holders. There is also the collateral benefit of reducing the
likelihood that advisors will garner rents from portfolio companies by currying
favor with their managers in how they exercise their power to vote the
portfolio’s shares.
Even though financial institutions are not monolithic in their missions or
operations, many do face a similar source of potential conflict to their managers
fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities by claiming their rightful share of
settlement funds.32 Banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies, three of the
five largest classes of financial institutions, are each vendors of financial
services and products. Their customers include corporations and accounting
firms, which are the grist of securities class actions. And, to the extent that
public pension funds and endowments appear not to have the same conflicts as
other types of institutions, those conflicts appear when the public pension fund
or endowment depends on outside money managers who have such conflicts.33
Financial service providers try not to align themselves with protagonists of
their clientele.34 This fact may explain why we find no recorded case where a
bank, mutual fund, or insurance company has served as a lead plaintiff in a
securities class action. Why should a firm step forward to lead the assault on
executives who have issued misleading reports if such visibility could pose
problems in soliciting banking, insurance, or pension services from other
executives who likely share the common view in executive suites that most
securities class action suits are strike suits?35 Standing shoulder to shoulder
with “class action lawyers” does not win one friends in the executive suites of
America or at the club. Moreover, there is only the thinnest social divide
between executives of banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds and
executives of industrial firms. These are groups of individuals who understand
one another and are aware of the price to be incurred by failing to honor that
31. Id. (noting that fund investors may “benefit from the improvement to corporate
governance that results from more conscientious proxy voting by fund managers”).
32. See generally supra note 27.
33. See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 27, at 596-97 (making
this point in reference to private pension funds).
34. Thus, we find that many types of financial institutions are not themselves the
proponents of a bylaw or other proposal that will alter the governance of their portfolio
companies, although they will, at times, vote in favor of such a proposal when advanced by
another less conflicted institution. See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 27, at
883-84. More pointedly, “[f]or a conflicted institution, crossing the street in a crowd is safer
than crossing alone.” Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 27, at 606.
35. We recognize that an institution may be averse to participating in individual class
action recoveries if it believes that a particular case is just extorting money from a company.
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understanding.36
The same social and commercial forces that prevent banks, mutual funds,
and insurance companies from stepping forward to be a lead plaintiff may also
weaken the commitment of their managers to assure the firm reaps the full
advantage of securities class action litigation. That which is distasteful socially
and harmful to business is easily accorded a low priority on the fund
executive’s agenda. Such benign neglect is understandable for several other
reasons as well. A firm that believes its financial success arises from managing
funds for others (i.e., a mutual fund advisor) or from playing the actuarial game
(i.e., an insurance company) is not likely to place a high value on establishing
and monitoring procedures to assure it participates in settlements affecting its
portfolio companies. Instead, submitting claims is likely to be viewed as
subsidiary to what the firm perceives to be its primary operations. Also, the
rewards to the firm of having a reasonably designed and administered system to
submit claims are likely to be slight relative to the firm’s other metrics of
success, so monitoring the claims process earns little, if any, executive
attention.37 As a result, this metric is not a metric of success that gets
measured, managed, or ultimately rewarded. When added to the cultural
baggage class actions enjoy in the executive suites, it is hard to fathom who
would be a champion for reviewing the firm’s internal procedures for
submitting proof of claims in settled securities class actions.38
36. Cf. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83
(1985) (examining the social and psychological forces, among which is membership in the
same social strata, that can impede the decision to sue).
37. For the view that pension fund trustees’ and managers’ tenure is largely invariant
to the overall performance of the fund, see Barnard, supra note 27, at 1140-41.
38. Those who advise mutual fund managers have misrepresented our position
regarding who has a fiduciary obligation and the nature of that obligation when pursuing
claims in settled securities class actions. See Steven W. Stone & Ryan F. Helmrich, The Role
of Investment Advisers in Client Class Action Claims, 12 INV. LAWYER 17 (2005), available
at http://morganlewis.com/pubs/Stone_InvestmentLawyer-Oct05.pdf. Their criticism of our
position conflates the decision to monitor whether the fund has reasonable processes
whereby it can participate in settled securities class actions with the decision whether to opt
out of a newly initiated securities class action or even participate as a lead plaintiff. We
earlier said that the decisions with respect to the former are quite different from those
involved in the latter. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 861-62. Also, no one disagrees
that mutual fund officers and directors are bound by fiduciary obligations that exist at
common law and apply across the board to officers and directors. Stone and Helmrich’s
disagreement is that these obligations extend to the fund’s external advisor, whom they see
as providing only investment advice and not guidance on noninvestment internal operations.
This position overlooks the substantial qualification that we emphasized in our earlier article,
namely that the applicable standard “involves some element of intent such that the standard
is more akin to that of recklessness.” Id. at 864. Following the wide interest in our 2002 pilot
study, following the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations’ ongoing
interest in the funds’ procedures for identifying possible settlements in which they may
participate, and now, following the more than fifty suits that have been filed against advisers
for failure to pursue claims in settled securities class actions (in which about one-half have
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B. A Rolling Stone Gathers No Moss
The data we have collected in our ongoing studies of securities class action
settlements reflect that the median length of a class period is 10.5 months and
that settlement notices are not circulated on average until 26.7 months after the
end of the class action period. This delay represents an average total time in
excess of three years that may have elapsed since an institution traded the
security that qualified it to participate in the settlement. If we assume that
institutions on average purchased or sold in the middle of the class action
period, the length of time between the trade that qualifies it for membership in
the class and the settlement is a very long time, about thirty-two months.
Moreover, there is a fairly broad distribution around these median points so that
we can safely say four years or more can elapse between the date of a trade that
occurred during the front end of the class action period and the publication of
notice of a settlement. This observation has serious implications for whether the
institution is likely to file a claim in settlement.
Most financial institutions do not manage their own funds but instead
oversee a stable of investment advisors. A well-managed fund periodically
reviews the performance of its advisors, terminating its relationship with underperforming advisors and substituting in their places those who emerge from
ongoing beauty contests. Moreover, institutions and their advisors, with some
frequency, change their custodian banks. Such changes are important because
often it is the custodian bank that is expected to file claims for institutions as
well as handle many of their back-office duties.
A departing investment advisor or custodian bank does not customarily
forward to the institution, or its successors, the trading records for the portfolio
it had previously handled. Therefore, a succeeding advisor, custodian, or the
institution itself will not have at hand sufficient information to evaluate
whether it has a provable claim that can be submitted to the settlement
administrator, but will need to depend on its predecessors to provide these data.
Furthermore, the settlement administrator’s notice of a settlement may well
be sent to the terminated investment advisor, or custodian, and not to the
institution or its current advisors or custodian bank. As described earlier, one
customary approach of claims administrators for imparting notice is relying
upon the CEDE list of beneficial ownership. This step likely identifies the
advisor or custodian so that the notice will be forwarded to it. Whether this
produces a submitted claim necessarily depends on the cooperation of the
earlier terminated advisor, or bank, as well as that advisor, or bank, having
retained reliable records covering its former client’s trading. The problems of
forwarding the notice are exacerbated by the passage of time between the date

been dismissed because the funds could prove they did submit claims), we believe a fund
sponsored by an advisor that systematically and consciously ignored any possible
participation in settled securities class actions would have acted recklessly.

COX & THOMAS 58 STAN. L. REV. 411

430

12/1/2005 10:13:44 AM

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:411

of the trade that qualifies the institution’s claim for participation in the
settlement and when the settlement notice is published. As seen above, several
years customarily separate the institution’s trade that qualifies it as a member of
a class and the circulation of the settlement notice. Although it is sound practice
for an advisor to retain records pertinent to its current clientele, the appeal of
retaining such records for former clients is much weaker.39
A further consideration is whether the terminated advisor can expect any
rewards for its efforts to identify whether a former client has a claim to be
submitted and to assemble the information needed for submission. Certainly,
one can attribute some goodwill to doing so, but the weight the institution
assigns to such responsible behavior on the part of its former advisor pales in
comparison with the dominant consideration in selecting advisors generally,
namely portfolio performance, in which the advisor has already been found
wanting. Similar considerations would apply for a former custodian bank.
C. Voting with Their Feet
Securities class actions, even in the post-PSLRA era, continue to have a
negative public image. Frankly, they are damned by the company they keep.40
They are perceived as resulting in small sums for class members and generous
fees for the suits’ attorneys. Our own data support the conclusion that
settlements in absolute dollars are fairly sizeable, but relative to the estimated
losses suffered by the class members, settlements yield small percentage
recoveries, with the bulk of such suits yielding less than ten cents on each
dollar of provable losses.41 To the extent these perceptions are shared by an
institution’s managers, they weaken the institution’s commitment to systematic
oversight of claims submissions when the institution is the beneficiary of a
settled class action.
A further consideration is how the institution’s managers likely frame their
evaluations of what commitment to make toward installing procedures for
submitting and monitoring claims in settled securities class actions. For
example, if the question is evaluated in the context of whether it is costeffective to install a reliable process for identifying probable claims, obtaining
the relevant documentation to submit a claim, and submitting the claim, then
we might expect a reasonable commitment level. The returns are easily

39. Even if it has retained these records, the rapid pace of technological change may
render them inaccessible at any reasonable cost. For example, if the records were kept in an
electronic file on a now antiquated system, they may no longer be machine readable by new
software systems. Although hand tabulation may still be possible, it is extremely costly.
40. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 497, 498-99 (1997) (reviewing some of the reasons the public holds class action awards
in low esteem).
41. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas (with assistance of Dana Kiku), SEC
Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 769, 771 (2004).
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determined, while the costs are low because they involve low-skill
administrative tasks that do not require the efforts of a professional. Nor do
these tasks require a significant number of personnel, especially if these tasks
are largely contracted out to a custodian bank. Compared to the low investment
that we believe would be necessary to reasonably staff a protocol to assure
submitting claims in settled actions, our data suggest that the expected returns
of such staffing would not just cover the costs of such a procedure but would
likely yield a fairly high positive return on those costs.
However, institutional managers who instead assess the desirability of
identifying and submitting claims in the context of the overall activities of the
fund can easily conclude that there are far better places to expend the fund’s
resources. That is, managers who view their objective as being well-performing
traders (i.e., beating the market) are less likely to value operations that are
removed from that role.42 For example, a few fund managers commented rather
casually to us that they did not value submitting claims because the expected
gains of doing so were dwarfed by both the size of the fund’s assets and the
average yearly returns earned by the fund through wise investment strategies.43
D. Who’s on First
The current operating environment for monitoring notice of settlements
likely includes a good amount of incompleteness in terms of relative
responsibilities. Despite the admirable and nontrivial efforts of claims
administrators to reach possible claimants, the system in large part depends on
there being a watchful eye on the part of the institutions. Notices directed to
custodians, advisors, or brokerage firms may not be received or, if received,
may not be forwarded to the individual who has responsibility for determining

42. Hence, Professor Black observes that a problem of the money-manager culture is
the managers’ focus on trading rather than the diligent pursuit of strategies that could
improve the governance and performance of their portfolio companies. See Black, Agents
Watching Agents, supra note 27, at 885-86.
43. Such responses are not inconsistent with the view that money managers and fund
managers do have strong market-based incentives to improve the overall performance of
their fund. See, e.g., id. at 877-81 (identifying bonuses and reputational advancement as two
considerations of both private and public fund managers). Because the relative gains through
diligent pursuit of settlement funds are not likely to have a material impact on either the
money or the fund manager’s income or reputation, it is understandable that devoting limited
executive time to oversight of settlement submissions will be crowded out by strategies the
manager believes he or she can pursue that will result in more significant rewards. At the
same time, Professor Black observes that managers of public pension funds are less likely to
have the same market-based incentives. Id. at 878. If this observation were the case, we
would expect that such managers would indeed allocate more of their time to assuring that
their fund had reasonably designed procedures to pursue their rightful share of settlements.
And, the market incentives are weakest for institutions like banks and insurance companies
that emphasize to their client base their “stability” rather than simply their performance. Id.
at 882.
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whether the institution has a provable claim and wishes to submit it to the
claims administrator.
This oversight might also be due to a failure of the institution to clearly
specify in its contract with its custodian, advisor, or broker the procedures to be
followed with respect to handling possible claims. Moreover, the institution’s
external agent may not have a definitive protocol to follow when receiving a
notice from the claims administrator. These problems are exacerbated in the
case in which the custodian, advisor, or brokerage firm has an unclear
obligation to peruse the financial press and other publications for notices of
settlements. The situation is ripe with the possibility of mutual
misunderstandings whereby the institution believes its interest is being
addressed by its custodian and advisor, when in fact the custodian or advisor
believes it has little or no responsibility to monitor settlement notices.
There is also the distinct possibility that breakdowns occur within the
institution or the custodian. Lines of authority, once clearly established, may,
with the passage of time and personnel, become blurred or forgotten. One can
imagine that institutions or custodians could assign to one of their staffers
responsibility for handling all matters related to the institution’s possible
securities claims. This obligation is not likely to be either the sole or primary
obligation of the employee. When an employee is evaluated on other functions,
those tasks that are evaluated will of course enjoy a higher order of attention by
the employee in terms of how the employee allocates his time. And, as
employees come and go in that position, there may be further blurring of that
position’s responsibilities with respect to monitoring custodians, advisors, or
publications for possible provable claims.
In sum, all the above-mentioned problems have a common source: a lack
of monitoring by the management of the institution. Each institution should
periodically evaluate whether its procedures and personnel are performing
reasonably well. This is an area where complacency can easily take hold,
especially since the institution’s managers likely prize money management
more highly than the pursuit of settlements. We also speculate that the system
for imparting notice and identifying possible claims may well exacerbate
cultural and economic forces such as those described above. That is, the greater
the friction and uncertainty that attend the process institutions must follow to
submit a claim, the more likely it is that the institution’s managers will
succumb to the temptations to slumber. Thus, any solution must address those
features of the claims process that pose uncertainty or difficulty on the part of
claimants.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY RESULTS
To try to unpack how institutional investors deal with the claims filing
process, we surveyed different groups of institutions about their practices in the
area. Initially, in early 2002, we designed a short survey that focused on three
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main issues: How did institutional investors get notice of settlements? Did they
know of any settlements of which they did not get notice? And, how did they
determine whether or not to file a claim in the settlements about which they
heard? We asked the Council for Institutional Investors (CII) to distribute the
survey to its membership,44 and we also distributed copies to a large number of
smaller public pension funds at a conference of police and fire pension funds.
We received only twelve completed surveys, three from CII members and nine
from the police and fire pension funds.
Our first question concerned how these investors received notice of
settlements in securities fraud class actions. Three-quarters of the respondents
replied that their primary (or exclusive) source of information was their
custodian bank, with smaller numbers reporting they had been contacted by
either the claims administrators or the company directly or that an employee of
the fund had read about the settlement in the financial press.45 However, only
four of the twelve respondents had an employee who was responsible for
regularly checking the financial press for settlement notices. We believe this
failure to designate an employee with responsibility to monitor various outlets
for notices of settlements is a significant one.
We then asked the investors if there had ever been a settlement in which
they later learned they had not received a notice. Seven of the twelve
institutions replied this had “never” occurred, two investors said it had
happened “a few” times, two responded they had not received a notice “some”
times, and one investor did not reply to this question. Interestingly, one
respondent that claimed it had never missed a settlement notice also stated that
it had never received any such notices.
Turning to the claims filing process, we asked two questions: Who filed
claims for the institution, and when did they decide to file claims?46 Each of
the CII respondents stated that their custodian banks filed all potential claims
for them.47 Of note is that the police and fire funds also appeared, in our
survey, less likely to file all claims irrespective of their value. Before filing a
claim, they considered the size of the fund’s loss, its estimated recovery, the

44. CII included a paragraph about the survey in its newsletter. This short note directed
interested members to our website where they could fill out the survey.
45. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and investors typically reported two
or three sources of information about settlements.
46. The reader should be aware that this discussion relates only to securities that are
held beneficially by the institutions. Some institutions hold only a small percentage of their
equity holdings beneficially because they have large holdings in commingled or indexed
funds, which are managed by outside money managers. These outside managers are expected
to file claims for the benefit of these funds, with the investors in the fund ultimately
benefiting. However, this fact does not present a problem for the purposes of supra Part II
because the institutions would not report these holdings on their Schedule 13F.
47. The police and fire funds were more diverse in their responses: two delegated
claims filing to their custodians, while the other seven had internal employees, such as a plan
administrator, chief accountant, or staff attorney, make these filings.
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size of the overall settlement, the importance of the stock in their portfolio, the
time and effort involved in filing a claim, and any publicity surrounding the
case.
The results of this initial survey were useful to us in several ways. First,
they highlighted the importance of the custodian bank in the claims filing
process, both as a source of information about settlements and as the party
responsible in many instances for filing the claims themselves, particularly at
the larger public pension funds. Second, this survey brought out two very
different approaches taken by institutions to claims filing. One set of
institutions outsourced the entire process of gathering notices and filing claims
to a third party, the custodian bank, while the second set of institutions relied
largely on internal employees to gather and file claims. Finally, we were also
intrigued by the difference in claims filing at the different size institutions, with
the larger public pension funds filing all claims, irrespective of their value, and
the police and fire funds taking a more textured approach, which considered the
costs and benefits of making a claim.
With these points in mind, we designed a second, much longer
questionnaire on institutional claims filing practices. At various points during
2003, we mailed this questionnaire to several hundred institutions, including all
of the members of CII and several other institutional investor organizations.
This second questionnaire focused on whether the institution used an internal or
external claims filing process and how that process worked, the factors
affecting the institution’s decision to file claims, the costs of filing claims and
how they are allocated, claims monitoring by institutions, allocation of any
recoveries to the fund, and the institution’s understanding about its duty to file
claims.
We received twenty-three replies to this questionnaire:48 twenty from
public pension funds, two from private pension funds, and one from a bank.
Given the proprietary nature of the information that we were requesting and the
length of the questionnaire, it is perhaps not surprising that the response rate
was so low. Because we were only trying to obtain a descriptive view of how
the claims filing system works, and not seeking to draw statistical inferences
from the data that we collected, we do not view the small percentage of replies
as a serious problem.
Our initial questions revisited the issue of whether there had been class
action settlements that occurred where the responding institution had later
learned that it had not received notice of the settlement. Eighteen of the
respondents claimed there were no such instances, one institution stated it had

48. Because we did multiple mailings with overlapping mailing lists, some institutions
received more than one questionnaire. In two cases, we received more than one reply from
the same institution, undoubtedly because of the repeat mailings. We thank those diligent
funds for taking the time to reply twice to our questionnaire, but felt we had to exclude their
second replies from our sample.
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learned of one such matter,49 and three fund representatives said that they “[d]o
not know.” Only one respondent said that because of delays with the mail, they
had received some notices too late to ask their custodian to file claims.50
The second section of the questionnaire was designed to determine which
funds used custodian banks to file their claims and which had internal staff that
handled these duties. Of the twenty public pension funds that responded,
seventeen delegated these duties to their custodian bank, one employed a
private law firm to file its claims, and the remaining two funds had internal
processes for claims filing.51
Of the seventeen public pension funds that employ a custodian bank to file
their claims, we found that fourteen of those funds,52 and both private pension
funds, have little involvement in the process other than receiving a report from
the custodian, usually once a month, about pending claims and monies received

49. It stated that, as a result, it had instituted new monitoring procedures to insure that
this failure would not occur again.
50. We cannot draw strong conclusions from these responses for several reasons,
although we note that the responses seem to conflict with our earlier empirical results. First,
the investors responding to our questionnaire are self-selected and likely to be those who
have better practices in the area. Thus, they may well be abnormal in terms of their approach
to filing claims. Second, given the widespread distribution and press coverage of our earlier
findings, those institutional investors that did not file claims are likely to have learned that
they have legal duties to do so. This awareness may have quickly led those funds to make
changes in the way they handled claims filing. These changes could account for why we see
a relatively high rate of nonfiling in the earlier time period covered by our claims
administrator data and a very low rate of self-reported failures found in the later survey
response period. Third, it is possible that the different fund employees responding to our
survey are unaware of any failures to file claims, or receive notice, especially if their
employer delegates such functions to its custodian bank and does not monitor that bank’s
activities. Finally, it is possible that the survey respondents were worried about potential
legal liability for failing to file claims and, therefore, chose not to report any such failures.
We view this possibility as unlikely given the confidential and anonymous nature of the
responses. Nonetheless, we address the liability standards for such failures below and find
that the likelihood of such liability would be low in most instances.
51. Both private pension funds employed their trustee bank to act as their custodian,
and it filed all of their claims for them. The bank respondent acted as its own claims filing
agent, apparently handling both its clients’ filing duties and those for its own accounts. The
two public pension funds that handled all of their claims internally had elaborate written
protocols on how to manage the process. Each assigned specific employees to receive and
process settlement notices, to interface with their custodian banks to obtain the information
that they needed to file claims, and to use computer tracking systems for all pending
settlements. Finally, the remaining fund had contracted with a private law firm to coordinate
filing claims with its custodian banks and to monitor all of its recoveries from class action
settlements. This law firm gave the fund’s personnel access to its settlement tracking system
to permit the fund to monitor its recoveries.
52. The remaining three funds that used custodians had active internal monitoring
systems for tracking settlement notices, claims made, and monies recovered from each
settlement. Each of these funds had specific personnel assigned to these tasks. The costs
associated with these activities were allocated as general administrative or investment
expenses of the fund, or considered part of the regular duties of the employees involved.
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from settlements.53 The custodian banks filed all of their client funds’ claims as
part of a larger set of services and thus did not charge a separate fee.54 These
funds, therefore, reported no costs associated with claims filing.
Section three of the questionnaire gathered information on a wide variety
of practices at the funds. First, we returned to the question of whether the
respondents filed all claims in class action settlements, and if not, what factors
led them to choose to file claims. Every pension fund respondent but one (we
discuss the bank respondent separately below) stated that they filed all claims,
with a few adding the qualifier that they excluded cases in which they were
ineligible or had opted out of the class.55 The one remaining pension fund
stated that their custodian bank had full discretion to file claims, although they
were expected to do so in every case in which the fund had suffered a loss.
Subject to all of the same qualifications we pointed out above with respect to
this question in our first survey, we note that these replies are apparently
inconsistent with the data reported in Part II. We also note that the unqualified
responses we received, if accepted at face value, mean that funds do not take
into account the cost of filing in deciding whether to make claims. This fact
could lead to inefficient behavior where the cost of filing the claim exceeds the
potential recovery.
This possibility raises a question about those funds that delegate all claims
filing duties to their custodian banks.56 We cannot be sure how the banks treat
the instruction to file all claims. Might it be that custodians only file costjustified claims, ignoring the instruction to file all claims? Of more concern is
that if the custodian receives a fixed fee for its services but pays all of the costs

53. Two of these public funds stated that they had recently retained an independent
claims filing service that monitored their custodians’ claims filing activities.
54. One respondent noted that it was in the process of negotiating a new agreement
with its custodian bank and that under the terms of that agreement, the custodian would
charge a separate fee for claims filing services.
55. Interestingly, our one bank respondent did not adopt such a blanket approach to
claims filing. Rather, it cited three factors—size of estimated recovery, size of loss suffered,
and size of overall settlement—as the most important considerations behind its decision
about whether to file a claim. It also noted that the costs involved in filing a claim could be
substantial, including technology-storage and retrieval costs, the costs of compiling data,
staff time and any overtime charges when deadlines needed to be met, and the direct costs
for supplies, postage, and shipping. Although this respondent was not (to our knowledge) the
custodian bank for any of our other respondents, it does suggest that the custodians are more
conscious of the cost-benefit balance involved in claims filing.
56. We asked our respondents if they believed that institutional investors, or their
custodian banks, had a fiduciary duty to file claims in securities class actions and, if so, what
the source of that duty was. The respondents that answered this question uniformly stated
“yes.” Some of the replies focused on the duties of the custodian bank to file claims, which
the respondents believed arose out of fiduciary and/or contractual duties. The remaining
answers discussed the institution’s duty to file claims. Here, the respondents consistently
pointed to trust principles, either under common law, state law, or ERISA, as the source of a
duty to file claims. We interpret these replies as reflecting a strong awareness on behalf of
these institutions of their obligations to file claims.
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of filing claims without reimbursement from the fund, as seems to be the norm
with most respondents, then the bank’s financial interests would seem to be to
do as little claims filing as possible. This result could lead to potential conflicts
with their client funds’ interests. This problem could remain undetected if the
client fund does little or no monitoring of the claims filed on its behalf.
Minimal fund monitoring does seem to have been the norm amongst our
respondents, although we note that hiring independent third-party monitors, or
having an active internal monitoring system at the fund, would address this
issue.
We then asked what our respondents felt was the most difficult aspect of
filing claims in securities class actions. Those funds that had delegated claims
filing to their custodian bank without much monitoring almost uniformly
reported that there was nothing difficult about the process. The other responses
identified three types of problems: learning about settlements and monitoring
claims, gathering and compiling the information necessary to perfect claims,
and accounting for the payments when they are received.
Those respondents who noted the difficulty in learning about settlements
suggested the creation of a central clearinghouse, or website, for information
about all securities fraud class action settlements.57 This step would aid
institutions in determining whether they have claims in different cases. We note
that the independent claims filing monitoring services with which we are
familiar have created proprietary databases which they use for this purpose.
The funds that mentioned the second problem, gathering and compiling
information for claims filing, recommended that filing requirements be
simplified and automated using standardized forms. The one bank respondent
also made similar proposals. In addition, one respondent suggested that claims
administrators should accept electronic data from known institutional investors
with digital signatures.
The final problem, accounting for the payments received, was one that we
had inquired about in a separate question in the survey. Ideally, we would want
to have any recovery that the fund makes credited to the accounts of those
persons that held interests in the fund at the time of the loss suffered in
proportion to their share of those losses. Administratively, however, this would
require the pension funds to engage in some complex calculations about who
the particular beneficiaries were at that point in time and what percentage of the

57. Respondents stated that the current claims notification system is not reliable. Given
the many twists and turns involved in getting notices of settlement from the company, or
claims administrator, to the beneficial owners, it seems inevitable that many notices will go
astray. One simple solution to the problem would be to require all beneficial owners to
provide issuers with current address information. This requirement would permit the
company to quickly generate a mailing list of all of its shareholders for use in distributing
settlement notices. An alternative but less satisfactory response to this problem would be for
courts to require all claims administrators to post settlement notices on a centralized website
or information clearinghouse.

COX & THOMAS 58 STAN. L. REV. 411

438

12/1/2005 10:13:44 AM

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:411

recovery they were entitled to receive and then to allocate what are likely to be
very small amounts of money to each of them, including those who have left
the fund. Given the difficulty of this exercise, we expected that funds would
adopt some form of simplified allocation system to determine where to place
these funds. We were not disappointed in our speculation.
What we learned from the questionnaires was that our respondents had
come up with two basic allocation techniques for funds recovered in these
settlements. Some funds deposited the monies recovered into the portfolio that
had suffered the loss, unless that portfolio had been terminated (usually because
the money manager was terminated), in which case, the money was deposited
into their general accounts for benefit payments. The second common method
was to put the monies directly into the fund’s general account for the benefit of
all beneficiaries.58 No respondents said that they allocated monies directly to
member accounts.59 Although it is hard to see a better practical solution to this
problem, it does raise a concern about whether securities fraud class action
settlements are indeed compensating those who were injured by the fraud.
We asked if the respondents had any additional information that they
wanted to provide us. Two funds emphasized the value of the independent
claims monitoring services that have emerged in the past few years. We agree
that these services have been a very positive development that should help
institutional investors monitor their custodian banks’ activities. These services
can also file claims on behalf of the institutions. If custodian banks continue to
move toward charging a separate fee for claims filing services, institutions may
want to look at the cost-effectiveness of the different services.
Finally, one respondent explained to us that most investment staff view
claims filing as unworthy of much attention for two reasons. First, they
consider their time better spent investing money rather than trying to recover
funds. Second, they view securities litigation as simply taking money from one
pocket (as owners) and putting it into another pocket (as victims) while paying
a percentage of it to the lawyers. Although we can certainly understand why
investment managers may feel this way, our response would be that they should
nevertheless hire a claims filing service to handle their claims because doing so
maximizes the value of their beneficiaries’ investment.
V. LIABILITY RULES
Taken as a whole, our results suggest a widespread failure to file claims in
securities fraud class actions, although our survey respondents claim otherwise.
As we noted,60 we suspect that this apparent conflict arises from a process of

58. For the defined benefit plans, this resulted in a credit to the employers’ accounts.
59. One respondent also assured us that the recovered monies did not get put into a
bonus pool for fund employees.
60. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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self-selection among the potential respondents to the survey. In this regard, we
note that the respondents to the survey represent a small minority of the
universe of institutional investors, or even of the group to whom we distributed
copies of our survey. An institution that does file claims is more likely to be
willing to complete our survey because they (and their legal counsel) are not
afraid of creating potential liabilities to their beneficiaries. Institutions that do
not file claims, on the other hand, could well decide to decline to complete the
survey and avoid self-reporting their potential breaches of fiduciary duties.
Moreover, a prudent advisor to an institutional investor might advise a
respondent against reporting widespread failures to file claims because of
concerns about the confidentiality of replies if subsequent litigation did
develop.61 For that reason, our data set does not permit us to undertake a fullscale institution-by-institution review of all potential securities fraud class
action claims that would be needed to conclusively resolve the conflict between
these two sets of data. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Part, we will
assume that at least some institutions have failed to file claims in securities
fraud class action settlements at some point in the past. If this assumption is
true, what are the legal implications for these derelict funds?
The first important issue is determining the appropriate legal standard to
apply in this situation. As we discussed in our earlier work,62 we believe that
institutional investors have a legal duty to file claims in securities fraud class
action settlements. There is amazing uniformity about the fiduciary obligations
of institutional investors to their investors in this area: these institutions cannot
abandon without reason a claim to recover funds in a securities fraud class
action settlement.63 Although an institution could, consistent with its fiduciary
obligation to maximize the value of its beneficiaries’ assets, decide not to file a
claim on the basis of comparing the costs to submit the claim with the expected
award from the settlement, we would generally expect this to be a one-sided
calculation in favor of filing for any actively trading institution. Moreover, as
we noted in Part IV above, our survey respondents appear to be well aware of
this duty. Furthermore, independent third-party claims filing services now
provide these services in exchange for a percentage of the amounts recovered,
making it difficult for institutions to continue to claim that they do not file
claims because they are devoting their internal resources to higher-valued uses.

61. Fears of potential litigation have not been unfounded, as scores of lawsuits have
been filed against mutual funds charging a failure to file such claims. Jonathan D. Glater,
Suits Contend Mutual Funds Fail To Collect in Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at
C1. To date, some courts hearing these cases have been reluctant to imply a private right of
action for investors to enforce section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. See
Mutchka v. Harris, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025-26 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378
F. Supp. 2d 861, 863-66 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
62. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 860-67.
63. Id.
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A. Institutional Investors
The asserted cause of action that might be brought against the institutional
investors’ trustees would be that by failing to cause their fund to file all costjustified claims in securities fraud class action settlements, they have breached
their duty of care to be active monitors of their funds’ performance. If this were
not just the complaint but also the governing standard, what, if anything, do the
trustees need to do to satisfy their fiduciary duties to file claims?
The Delaware Chancery Court has previously addressed a similar type of
problem in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.64 In
approving a derivative lawsuit settlement, then-Chancellor Allen addressed the
plaintiff shareholders’ claim that the board had breached its duty of care by
failing to monitor its operations for potential violations of federal law. The
Chancellor rejected the defendant’s claim that a board had no duty to monitor
whether the corporation was operating within the boundaries of the law to
accomplish its purposes. Instead, he found that the directors had a duty to make
“a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system
is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate
information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary
operations” so that the board can satisfy its duty of care.65 If the directors failed
to attempt in good faith to insure that the firm had an adequate information and
reporting system, the Chancellor stated that this failure could render them
“liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”66
Moreover, if the directors put a system in place and subsequently learned that it
was inadequate, they would have a duty to make a good faith determination
about how best to correct the system’s failure. It appears to us that swept within
the monitoring obligations of trustees and directors of financial institutions lies
an obligation to have reliable systems in place to collect for their funds any
sums to which they are entitled (provided, of course, that the expected benefits
justify the costs of presenting a claim).
Trustees at funds without claims filing systems, or with systems suffering
from systematic failures, who do not act to address their problems face a threat
of potential liability for the amount of money that they left on the table. We
believe that in order to satisfy their oversight responsibilities, the trustees of
institutional investors must, in good faith, insure that their fund has an adequate
system in place to identify and process the funds’ claims. Furthermore, they
should establish a monitoring mechanism to insure that this system is adequate,
and if they learn it is inadequate, they must take measures to fix the problems.
This standard is not onerous.67 For those institutions that have in good faith
64.
65.
66.
67.

698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 970.
Id.
As Chancellor Allen wrote in Caremark,

In order to show that the Caremark directors breached their duty of care[,] . . . plaintiffs
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already contracted for their claims filing duties to be carried out by their
custodian banks, it would appear they have put in place a reasonably designed
system. However, any system requires periodic review, so we further suggest
that there is a need to engage in routine monitoring activities to insure that the
custodian is doing its job.68 Our survey responses tell us that the norm in this
situation is for the custodian to send the fund a periodic statement about
recoveries without much additional monitoring by the fund. From a best
practices perspective, we would urge the funds using custodian banks in this
manner to do more to monitor them, either through periodic audits or by hiring
an independent third-party claims monitor. However, unless a fund was aware
that its custodian was performing its claims filing duties badly and the fund’s
trustees consciously decided to do nothing about it, the current practice would
likely be sufficient to protect fund trustees from liability. A fund that relies on
custodians to file its claims but has employees that actively monitor its
custodian’s activities should also face little legal liability risk, so long as the
trustees respond actively and in good faith if evidence emerges that the claims
process is malfunctioning.
Our analysis is similar for those funds that handle all of their own claims
filing internally, relying solely on custodians or others to provide them with the
transaction data necessary to perfect the claim. If the fund’s trustees have acted
in good faith in setting up the internal process and there is no evidence that the
system is failing, then they should be protected from liability. For these funds,
best practices should include the creation of written protocols that describe the
steps in their process and that set forth clear lines of responsibility for each of
the various steps that must take place to insure claims are filed on a timely
basis. For funds using internal processes, having periodic outside audits, or
ongoing monitoring, of their systems may be particularly important to make
sure that they work effectively.
One final point concerns the potential liability of trustees that choose not to
file claims in cases where they have potential conflicts of interest, such as
mutual funds that fail to file claims because they do not want to antagonize
potential clients for their services. Here, we see the possibility that the trustees
will have breached their duty of loyalty by placing their own financial interests
ahead of those of their beneficiaries.69 This legal standard is much more strict
would have to show either (1) that the directors knew or (2) should have known that
violations of the law were occurring and, in either event, (3) that the directors took no steps
in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that such failure proximately
resulted in the losses complained of . . . .

Id. at 971.
68. The custodian bank can further delegate these duties to a subagent so long as it is
“usual in managing a client’s investments and is not unreasonable or inconsistent with the
express terms of the customer service agreement.” JOHN J. QUARRELL, THE LAW OF PENSION
FUND INVESTMENT 29 (1990).
69. See In re Honeywell Int’l ERISA Litig., No. 03-1214, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21585, at *44-45 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2004) (upholding, against motion to dismiss, allegations
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than the Caremark test, which serves to reinforce the need for institutions to
create adequate claims filing systems.
B. Custodians
Custodial liability for failure to file claims could arise from one of two
sources: first, contractual duties arising from any agreement between the
investor and the custodian and, second, the custodian’s general fiduciary duty
to its clients. As to the former, if the parties’ contract specifies that the
custodian is responsible for handling any aspect of the claims filing process and
the custodian fails to perform those services with reasonable care and diligence
in accordance with the contract, then it could be held liable under general
contract law.70 It is likely that the contractual requirements, either explicitly or
implicitly, would include as well the professional obligation that the agents
must exercise “the degree of care that is expected of the reasonable, average
member of the profession . . . .”71
The source of the custodian’s fiduciary duty is the agency relationship
between it and the client fund. The custodian holds legal title to the securities
that its customer, the institutional investor, owns beneficially and must manage
this property for the benefit of the institutional investor. This control over the
property of another creates fiduciary obligations under both the duty of care
and duty of loyalty in performing its duties. In regards to the claims filing
process, we are primarily concerned with the duty of care prong of its fiduciary
obligations.72
Some custodians will only hold title for the securities of their customers,
without having any active involvement in the claims filing process. Such
custodians need only concern themselves with insuring that their customers
receive notice of class action settlements.73 This obligation would certainly
that plan fiduciaries breached their duty of loyalty to their beneficiaries by investing in firm
stock where their compensation partially depended on inflating the firm’s stock price); In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003)
(similar).
70. QUARRELL, supra note 68, at 27-28 (“[T]he degree of care and skill which the law
of contract demands of an agent is similar to the normal duty of care in negligence.”).
71. Id. at 28.
72. The duty of care in this instance could overlap with that imposed by contract.
73. With respect to the gathering of notices, we can envision three situations in which
a custodian might incur liability. The first would arise if the custodian did not receive notice
about the settlement directly from the class agent but should have known about the
settlement because a notice was published in the financial press, yet failed to send notice of
the settlement to the beneficial owners of the securities. Second, the custodian may have
received the notice of settlement or otherwise become aware of the settlement but never
acted to send this notice along to its eligible customers. Finally, a custodian could receive
notice of the settlement and try to mail such notice to its eligible customers but be unable to
do so because it lacks address information for former customers who have changed their
addresses.
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include forwarding any notice received from the claims administrator. Absent a
contractual undertaking to do so, it is not likely that such a custodian’s
obligation should be expanded to an affirmative obligation of actively
reviewing publications such as The Wall Street Journal for notices of
settlements. However, custodian banks may take on the additional function of
screening publications for possible settlements involving their clients, filing
claims, or providing adequate information to the party that files the claims on
behalf of the institutional investor.74 In such a case, they would also assume
fiduciary obligations with respect to their performance of these tasks.
Not addressed in the contract are the obligations that flow from the advisor
or the custodian to the fund after the fund has severed its relationship with that
advisor or custodian. From our discussions with industry participants, we are
aware that many funds regularly change their custodian or other advisor
relationships as part of their obligations to monitor the costs and performance
of their vendors. As seen earlier, the median length of time from the beginning
of a class action period to publication of a settlement notice exceeds three
years. During this period, it is natural to expect that the advisor or custodian
responsible for the fund’s securities at the time the fraud giving rise to a claim
arose may not be the same advisor or custodian at the time notice of a
settlement is published. Whether the subsequent agent files a claim on behalf of
the fund rests initially upon whether it has received the trading records during
the tenure of an earlier advisor or custodian.
At the same time, we can question the incentives for the former advisor or
custodian to diligently monitor and pursue possible claims on behalf of its
former clients. As between the fund and its former advisor or custodian, it
would appear the obligation is on the part of the fund to assure itself that its
trading records and other support documents are transferred to it or to the new
advisor or custodian so that reasonable monitoring for future settlements can
occur. Correlatively, it does not appear that this burden would continue on the
part of the former advisor or custodian in the absence of an explicit
understanding that the former, now terminated, advisor or custodian would
continue to monitor publications for possible settlement notices. We strongly
suspect that there is substantial breakdown on the part of funds to address
issues that arise when a fund changes its advisors or agents.
A pension fund that brought an action for breach of contract or fiduciary
duties would need to establish that the failure to file constituted the proximate

74. Those custodians that also handle their clients’ claims filing duties face an
additional set of potential liabilities if they are negligent in performing their duties.
Assuming that the custodian has received timely notice and timely instructions from its
client to file a claim in the settlement, it needs to ensure that it generates the appropriate
documentation of trading activities within the class period, completes the paperwork
associated with filing the claim, and returns the claim materials to the settlement
administrator by the filing deadline. A negligent failure to perform any of these functions
could lead to custodian liability for breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duties.
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cause of a lost recovery. It would also need to come up with an estimate of the
lost recovery, which would likely be far less than the amount of the full damage
claim that was not filed.75 However, assuming these elements could be
established, the custodian’s damages for breach of this duty could be
determined by the amount of the lost recovery.76
VI. EASY STEPS TO ENSURE THAT INSTITUTIONS RECEIVE THEIR FAIR SHARE
Our survey revealed several ways in which the present system needs to be
modified so as to be both more efficient and reliable in the way notice of claims
is imparted. We considered each of these issues and offer the following
recommendations.
A. Establish a Centralized Information Clearinghouse
As described above, claims administrators presently pursue a variety of
approaches to impart notice, but none of the strategies we examined entails
publishing notice of settlements in a common location. For example, some
claims administrators publish notice in the national press but not always in the
same newspaper. Notice of settlements is also observed by prospective
claimants in Class Action Alert. However, our perusal of that publication
suggests that not all settlements appear therein. Our survey results support the
view that institutions would benefit from greater certainty regarding where they
could access information that would enable them to determine whether they are
the beneficiaries of a settlement. Therefore, our first recommendation is that all
settlement notices, claim forms, and information on how to file claims should
be available to anyone through a centralized website.
Accomplishing this objective need not be difficult or expensive. Securities
fraud class action settlements must be approved by federal courts. It would
seem a simple matter for courts to condition their approval upon the settlement
administrator posting, on a centralized website, all of this information. Each
settlement could be assessed a modest fee to pay for the creation and
maintenance of such a website. The website could be operated by a court,
private company, or educational institution. It would also be possible to link to
that website an automatic forwarding of new postings to those who wish to

75. In our earlier paper, we found that actual recoveries were only about one-third of
provable losses in the small sample of cases where we had sufficient data to make these
calculations. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 877 tbl.3.
76. A custodian bank could seek to limit its potential liability on claims of this type by
inserting an appropriate clause into its contract with its clients. An interesting question
would then arise concerning whether such a limitation would also apply to damages for
breach of fiduciary duty. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
49 (Del. 1994) (rejecting an argument that a board of directors could limit its fiduciary
obligations by contract).
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subscribe to the service so that institutions could automatically receive notice
of new settlements.
The creation of this type of information clearinghouse would greatly
increase the availability of information about settlements for institutional
investors, custodians, and individual investors. Given the numerous anecdotes
we heard regarding the difficulties of insuring that notice reaches all of the
many potential filing parties, it seems like a low-cost solution to what many
participants claim is a major problem.
B. Standardize Trading Documentation and Claims Forms
A second recurrent complaint by our survey participants was that each
settlement utilized different claims forms, required different forms of proof that
the institution was a class member, and sought different documentation of the
amount of investors’ claims. Each of these problems could be easily addressed
by the creation of a set of standard claims forms that embody a uniform set of
requirements for proof of class membership and size of claim. Such
standardized forms could be made available on the centralized information
website. Creating the forms would be a relatively trivial matter for the main
participants in the process once the federal courts mandated their adoption.
There should be no difficulty in forms being so standardized. Processing
claims arising in connection with securities regulation settlements involves the
same issues case after case. The dominant and recurring issues are the dates of
trading by the claimant and proof to support the underlying trading.
Standardizing the information and format to follow when filing claims would
reduce the custodians’ and investors’ costs without creating any additional
work for settlement administrators. If an unusual settlement arose, for which
the existing forms would not be appropriate, the settlement administrator could
ask the court for permission to use an individually tailored form, but we think
that this would be a rare occurrence.
C. Improve Institutional Monitoring of Claims Filing
The majority of our survey respondents did very little monitoring of their
custodians or advisors to determine if they were forwarding settlement notices
and, for those contracting out claims filing services, filing claims. All
institutions should seriously reevaluate their systems, and, based on our
experience, we believe most institutions should consider adopting more
aggressive monitoring systems to insure that they are receiving their share of
the available settlement money. A step toward correcting this oversight would
be an annual review by the institution’s trustees of the past year’s claims. This
step would not only reinforce the trustees’ obligations to monitor this activity
but surely would also set in place internal procedures to complement the
heightened scrutiny of this aspect of the institution’s activities.
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The creation of a centralized information source on securities class action
settlements, as suggested earlier, would make this monitoring much easier
because it would permit an institution to assign a staff member to conduct a
periodic search of the website for cases involving the investor’s portfolio
companies. Alternatively, some institutions may hire an independent third-party
claims service to perform this monitoring function for them. In any case, it is of
the utmost importance that institutions develop procedures to assure that
records of trading are passed on to successive advisors or custodians or, better
yet, to the institution itself. As discussed earlier, one of the great problems
confronting institutions in presenting their claims may be the substantial
passage of time that transpires between when the trade giving rise to the claim
occurred and when notice of a settlement is imparted. During this interval—
which, as seen earlier, is often measured in years—custodians or advisors are
likely to have changed. It is difficult for us to believe that an ex-advisor or excustodian has the same commitment to its former client as it has to its current
clients. Thus, if an institution assures itself that the relevant trading records are
forwarded to it whenever it has terminated either the custodian or advisor, the
institution could thereby responsibly monitor settlement notices for possible
claims that it could submit.
D. Strengthen Institutions’ 13F Filing Requirements
We believe the core factor explaining institutions’ poor claims record is
that, in most instances, notice of a settlement is not directly imparted to the
institutions. Our survey results reflect a heavy dependence by institutions on
publication of notice or on their advisors or custodians to learn of a settlement.
As seen earlier, notice is not imparted directly to the institutions because they,
like their retail customer counterparts, hold shares in street names. Moreover,
institutions are more likely to rely on discretionary trading by their advisors,
which is another reason for shares being recorded in another’s name. As a
result, several layers of records must be penetrated if the notice is to reach the
ultimate beneficiary of a settlement.
One sweeping response to this problem would be to require each issuer to
maintain reliable records of their beneficial owners. This requirement would
essentially mandate a Non-Objecting Beneficial Ownership (NOBO) list for all
public companies. Such a regulatory response would have the collateral effect
of facilitating stockholder communications among themselves, not to mention
proxy contests, because such a list could be accessed by any stockholder of the
company. However, this development might not be well received by the
company’s management because under the all-important Delaware corporate
law, stockholders are not entitled to the NOBO list unless the company
currently has that list in its possession, and this provision is often invoked in
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the heat of a takeover battle.77 Moreover, many institutions value anonymity
regarding their holdings and trading and would oppose changes that make such
information public.
A much less intrusive change is simply to tweak the current Form 13F
filing methodology so that it is consistent with the objectives Congress sought
to achieve in 1968 when Section 13(f) reporting requirements were
mandated.78 The section’s purpose was, among other things, “to facilitate the
collection and public dissemination of information concerning the holding of
and transactions in securities by institutional investment managers.”79
Form 13F filings currently fail to fulfill this congressional mandate. One
fundamental concern is the overall level of compliance with Section 13(f)’s
disclosure requirements. Our review of the LexisNexis database reveals no
SEC enforcement action for noncompliance with Section 13(f) in the
legislation’s thirty-six-year history. Either there is remarkable compliance with
the provision or a similar level of inattention to this provision by the SEC. The
former is necessary if Form 13F is to be the linchpin for improved notice of
securities class action settlements. Even if there is a solid record of timely and
accurate filings of Form 13F, the SEC needs to improve the ability of third
parties to access the information collected through Form 13F.
Currently, the SEC licenses to Spectrum the right to publish in electronic
and paper format information the SEC gains through Form 13F. There are two
major problems with the current Spectrum database. First, the software system
used by Spectrum does not allow users to search the database using the twin
parameters of a time period and a specific issuer. For example, in undertaking
our own efforts to access Form 13F filings, after discussions with Spectrum’s
technical staff, we had to abandon any effort to assemble the data we needed
electronically. Instead, we had to undertake extremely time-consuming hand
reviews of printed copies of Spectrum data. This software glitch renders the
Form 13F filings impractical as a source that claims administrators could use
for imparting notice.
We therefore suggest that the SEC reevaluate its own capacity to make this
information available through its EDGAR database and to incorporate into that
electronic database search protocols for Section 13(f) filings that would better
77. See Shamrock Assocs. v. Tex. Am. Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 658, 661 (Del. Ch.
1986). Moreover, the stockholders cannot compel the list to be prepared and obtained.
Compare RB Assocs. of N.J., L.P. v. Gillette Co., No. CIV.A.88-9711, 1988 WL 27731, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1988) (holding there was no obligation of management to obtain
NOBO list upon request of stockholder), with Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir.
1991) (interpreting New York statute to require company to compile NOBO list).
78. Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act was added in 1975. Pub. L. No. 9429, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). The addition was partly a response to the concern caused by the
dramatic increase of the amount of securities held and traded by institutional investment
managers during the middle and late 1960s. S. REP. NO. 94-75 (1975), as reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 256-66.
79. Pub. L. No. 94-29, pmbl., 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
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accommodate the likely informational needs of claims administrators and
others. Moreover, the SEC should assume responsibility for making available
the Form 13F information rather than requiring users of that information to
incur substantial subscription fees to access that database. Even if the SEC
believes it most appropriate to license this information to a third-party vendor,
it should at least insist that the licensed vendor modify its electronic operating
system so as to permit searches that claims administrators are likely to make
using that database.
A second problem with the information collected on Form 13F is that it
does not identify who is the beneficial owner of the reported shares. The
obligation imposed by Section 13(f) extends to the entity that invests as well as
its advisor. Frequently, Form 13F is filed by the institution’s advisor, who lists
the shares held by it for all its clients. Thus, Form 13F does not presently lead a
third-party user of that data, who beneficially owns the shares, to be reported
on Form 13F. It may well be that the beneficial owner wishes anonymity.
Indeed, the SEC rules embrace a process for certain information to be filed
confidentially through Form 13F.80 We believe that with only modest effort on
the part of the SEC, it should be possible to require the beneficial owner of
shares being reported on an advisor’s filings to be identified confidentially. The
next shoe to drop in this procedure is, consistent with the institution’s likely
concern for confidentiality, for the SEC to develop an electronic system
whereby notices can be forwarded from the claims administrator, through the
SEC, to the institution that beneficially owns the holdings reported by its
advisor’s Form 13F filing. Such a development would ensure that notice is
directly imparted to the beneficial owner, which would allow for better
monitoring of the advisor’s discharge of its obligations to present claims.
E. Improve Claims Filing Systems
At present, a wide variety of claims filing systems are being employed by
institutional investors—some of which are very effective, while others are quite
haphazard. A more standardized and systematic approach needs to be put in
place. Government regulators can play an important role in bringing about this
change. Almost all institutional investors are subject to some type of regulation
by the federal government. The SEC, U.S. Department of Labor, and Federal
Comptroller of the Currency could use their regulatory powers to facilitate
better monitoring by establishing clear guidelines concerning claims filing
80. Institutional investment managers may request confidential treatment of
information in filings on Form 13F on the basis, among others, that the information would
reveal an investment manager’s ongoing program of acquisition or disposition. Shareholder
Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment
Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8393, 82 S.E.C. Docket 943 n.85 (Feb. 27, 2004);
see also Form 13F, Report of Institutional Investment Manager Pursuant to Section 13(f)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 (2005).
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practices and duties for the fiduciaries under their respective regulatory
jurisdictions. Alternatively, a law-reform organization could develop such a set
of guidelines, borrowing from some of the more successful systems that are
currently in place. Finally, institutions themselves could copy other wellperforming systems or draw on their own experience in processing proxy
information and casting their votes as a potential model for how they can create
a better claims filing system.
VII. THE SOCIAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR DATA AND SURVEY
A. The Mismatch of Injury and Recovery
Our survey and data raise several points that have important policy
implications. The first arises out of the manner in which institutions distribute
recoveries from securities fraud class action settlements. As discussed earlier,
all of the institutions that responded to our survey allocated any settlement
funds they received either to the particular portfolio that held the affected
securities or placed their recovery into a general fund. To be sure, from a
practical standpoint, it is hard to see what else they could do. Nevertheless,
regardless of which of these two options are pursued, the end result is the same:
the ultimate beneficiaries of the recovered settlement are unlikely to be (except
in the case of endowments) the same in identity or proportion as those who
actually suffered the loss.
The fact that class action recoveries by institutions are not allocated to the
individual fund beneficiaries connects with a larger question: Are class actions
capable of serving a compensatory function? For example, if an alleged fraud
occurs seven years prior to a settlement, which is not uncommon, many if not
all of the institutions receiving payments from the settlement will have
experienced significant turnover in their beneficiaries during that time period.
Many investors who had money invested in the fund, or who were employed at
the company or governmental entity for which the fund invests, may well have
withdrawn their money by the time of settlement. These injured beneficiaries
(and in the case of mutual funds, investor-beneficiaries) will not share in the
benefit from these payments; instead, the payments are a windfall for the other
fund beneficiaries.81 In short, there is a mismatch between those investors who
suffered losses and those who benefit from the recovery.
Even larger windfalls are raised, and a growing awareness of the

81. One commentator on this Article pointed out that if an institutional investor
regularly files claims, there is likely to be a consistent flow of recoveries that will accrue to
beneficiaries of the fund. Thus, on average, all beneficiaries will receive some level of
compensation for their losses. However, there will still be a mismatch between the specific
settlement payments and the specific beneficiaries who were originally harmed. We believe
this mismatch leaves open the question of the compensatory function being played by these
cases.
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noncompensatory feature of securities class action settlements is posed, by our
finding that approximately seventy percent of the institutions with provable
losses fail to present their claims. Against such a record, it is difficult to
envision the securities class action as serving a compensatory purpose, except
for the diligent minority. When this observation is coupled with evidence that
the settlement amount in any class action represents a very small part of the
losses suffered by the class members, it is even more difficult to attribute a
compensatory mission to the securities class action. Indeed, there is a perverse
irony in the institutions’ dismal record in presenting their claims. By letting
billions slip through their fingers, institutions essentially enhance the amounts
recovered by those investors who present their claims. That is, their slumbering
actually enhances the compensatory quality of securities class actions for those
who do file claims.
Would settlement amounts be greater if the institutions more frequently
presented their claims? We can only speculate. Securities class actions are a
zero-sum game. In any given case, whether more or fewer claimants appear
does not affect the size of the settlement. And, per our experience, the
settlement amount is fixed and lies well below the provable losses suffered by
the class.82 To be sure, the settlement is reached in the shadow of the law and
with some sensitivity to the losses suffered by the class. An awareness that
more claimants than customary will appear, perhaps because of wide adoption
of the reforms counseled above, could change the settlement negotiations in
that larger settlements would emerge to appease the claimants.
A dramatic shift upwards in the number of claimants in settled suits may
well cause some drift upward in settlement amounts. However, we suspect that
settlements are fixed, even in the face of unquestioned skulduggery and huge
provable losses, by the amount of available insurance or cash from the issuer.
One empirical observation consistent with our belief that settlements are
bounded by considerations far more compelling than the losses suffered by the
class is the sheer magnitude of the provable losses in so many settled securities
class actions. Our ongoing studies, as well as those by others, consistently
report that most settlements recover substantially less than even ten cents on
each dollar of provable losses suffered by the class. This finding exists even
though settlements, in absolute amounts, are well above the level that would
lead one to believe that they are baseless actions in which defendants are
content to settle for small sums that are below their costs to aggressively defend
themselves. That is, provable losses are immense even in cases where the
settlements involve sums in excess of $30 million. These data are consistent
with our belief that most settlements are bounded by insurance and a healthy
respect for the fact that any significant contribution to the settlement in excess
of available insurance as a practical matter can only be from the corporation
itself. As developed below, the latter cannot be seen as a wholly positive
82. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 877-78.
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development for the members of the class.
A second moderating factor is the low likelihood that claimants may object
to the settlement due to the low recovery (an even lower per share recovery if
institutions slumber less) because of the friction that objectors face. For
example, few settlements are rejected due to the issues raised by objectors;
those who do object have to bear their own cost to appear, and unless they seek
to intervene before the trial court, they lack standing to appeal approval of the
settlement.83
We are very skeptical that class actions can be seen as purely or
substantially compensatory. Frankly, we believe that the losses suffered by the
class members are generally so immense that in most cases it would be
financially crippling to the corporation if the settlement compensated investors
fully, or nearly so, for their losses. It is well understood that in most securities
class actions, the defendant corporation whose misleading report caused
investors to trade rarely, if ever, benefits at a level commensurate with the loss
its misleading report has caused.
For example, consider Issuer A whose managers materially inflate earnings
in its annual report for two successive years (as well as in its interim financial
reports). The managers carried out this scheme to enable them to reap the
rewards of their stock options and bonuses, both being dependent on increasing
the value of the company’s shares. When the lie is discovered, the stock
declines twenty percent, and a class action is filed on behalf of 1500 investors
who purchased Issuer A shares at prices inflated by the misleading reports. To
simplify the example, assume these 1500 investors held their shares through
settlement and collectively represent twenty-five percent of Issuer A’s
outstanding shares. Assume further that the provable losses suffered by the
class members are $1 billion (reflecting that the company’s market
capitalization is $20 billion). It should be apparent that if Issuer A were to pay
for the sins of its managers, the class members would indirectly absorb twentyfive percent of such payment. Thus, with the consequent decline in the value of
Issuer A due to such payment, it would appear that the class members would
not be restored to the financial positions they had before purchasing Issuer A
shares.
Moreover, a settlement fully reflecting the class’s provable losses would be
disproportionate to the gain garnered by the executives, unless these profits
approached the settlement amount, which appears difficult to imagine. The real
harm falls on the Issuer A stockholders, who bear a significant burden for the
faults committed by the managers acting in their own interests, rather than the
interests of the corporation. Finally, the settlement ignores the windfall that has

83. See, e.g., White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that only
if the intervenor improves the settlement can her attorney be compensated from the resulting
fund). See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX AND HAZEN ON
CORPORATIONS § 15.16 (2d ed. 2003).
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been reaped by the former Issuer A stockholders who disposed of their shares
to members of the class at a higher value ($1 billion) than they would have
received had Issuer A’s financial reports been truthful. In this context, we
might ask how compensation could ever be the sole objective of the securities
laws.
The complementary consideration to compensation is deterrence.
Compensation and deterrence do not work at cross purposes; instead, they
should be seen as supporting each other.84 If class actions are not fulfilling a
compensatory function, then we need to pay more attention to whether they
deter fraud. Issuer response to the deterrent effects of class actions could be
detected by their adoption of internal procedures to prevent reporting
violations. In this regard, we believe that the focus in these cases must shift
from trying to conscript a company’s resources to compensate class members
to instead imposing a sanction of sufficient size and content to deter others
from failing to monitor their reporting mechanisms, which in turn deters
fraudulent reporting. Such a sanction can be, as it is now, a small percentage of
the losses suffered by the class. And, of course, a greater emphasis should
instead be placed upon pursuing the actual wrongdoers, typically the officers.85
Traditionally, these individuals have escaped liability in securities fraud class
actions, as plaintiffs’ attorneys have agreed to settlements without insisting on
the officers being held accountable. Deterrence would be more effective if
companies knew it was in their best interests not to protect the real culprits.
What would it take to increase the deterrent effect of securities fraud class
actions against individual officers? At a minimum, the officers should be liable
for the amount of any benefit that they obtained from the fraud, times some
multiplier of those damages, to reflect the likelihood that their fraud would
escape detection and the amount of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for bringing
the action.86 To further the disciplinary impact of imposing liability upon the
responsible officers, their employers should be prohibited from providing them
insurance or indemnification for these damages.87
84. For a discussion of not only the complementary nature of the compensation and
deterrent undercurrents, but also how the courts nevertheless unwisely mold doctrines to
favor the former when there is a conflict between these twin objectives, see James D. Cox,
Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1985).
85. See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3
(1999) (noting that greater emphasis needs to be placed on deterring officer wrongdoing).
86. Employers could impose these penalties in employment contracts by inserting
appropriate language into the definition of what constitutes termination for cause and then
requiring the officer to reimburse the company for any penalties assessed for securities fraud
violations.
87. Thus, in Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 1996),
an officer who knowingly violated the Commodity Futures Trading Act could not recover on
a provision of his employment contract that provided for indemnification of any claims
arising from his employment. But, such indemnification is permitted where the conduct does
not otherwise offend public policy. See, e.g., VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 85
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Two other important issues would need to be satisfactorily resolved in such
a system: first, how to incentivize the plaintiffs’ bar to bring such actions and,
second, how to minimize the number of frivolous suits that are filed. These two
issues are intimately intertwined. Entrepreneurial attorneys are more likely to
bring too many suits, including strike suits, if there are high potential financial
payoffs and low barriers to filing; on the other hand, higher barriers and lower
payoffs are likely to cut down on the number of cases, including meritorious
ones.
The knowledgeable reader has by now recognized that these same issues
concerning the private enforcement of the federal securities laws have arisen
recurrently.88 Unfortunately, moving toward a deterrence-oriented regime will
not eliminate such issues. At present, there is simply no way to calculate
accurately the costs and benefits of raising or lowering barriers to filing fraud
cases, or for that matter increasing or decreasing the returns to attorneys for
filing them. What we can say on the basis of the data gathered in this study is
that certain moderate reform steps can be taken which we believe will raise the
consciousness among fund claimants of not just whether they have a claim but
whether their interests are best served by the proposed settlement. Until we
have these improvements, it is not possible to assess what is likely to be the
effect on the conduct of class actions when many fewer institutions are asleep
through the settlement process.
B. Filing Claims Does Matter
Our second concluding point is a response to a short article by Professor
Adam Pritchard that commented on our earlier paper. Professor Pritchard asked
whether we should care that not all institutions file claims; he concluded that
we should not.89 His main point was that even a few billion dollars is small
change to institutional investors because they manage trillions of dollars for
investors. We believe that to so conclude misses the point.
We think it does matter that many institutional investors do not file claims.
For one thing, under current law, pension fund trustees are held to a standard of
maximizing the value of their assets under management for others. If this
concept is to have any real content, we cannot start adding qualifiers like the

(Del. 1998) (permitting mandatory indemnification for an officer who was held liable for
actions committed on a subsidiary corporation’s board).
88. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711-15 (1996) (discussing the tradeoffs
between screening out good suits and letting in bad ones inherent in PSLRA’s restrictions on
filing securities fraud cases); Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act? (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Paper No. 03-04, 2005), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=558285 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (analyzing the
impact of PSLRA on the filing of meritorious cases).
89. Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (2002).
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duty of care applies “only if really big money is involved.”90 Fiduciaries do,
and should be required to, take all cost-justified measures to increase the value
of beneficiary assets.
Moreover, we think it is important that institutional investors are involved
in the settlement process and, more generally, in securities fraud class actions.
If the system needs reform, as both we and Professor Pritchard agree it does,
the more institutional investors are active participants, the more pressure will
be placed on the system to improve. The claims filing process needs to be
fixed, and the institutions are in the best position to push for needed changes. If
the current system and its related practices continue, we will continue to
document apathy among institutional claimants and lose some of the impetus
for making the provisions of the PSLRA work to the benefit of all investors.
CONCLUSION
To summarize our results, we find some significant problems in the current
claims filing system. Using a much larger sample of settlements than in our
earlier paper, we determine that a large majority of institutional investors failed
to file claims in securities fraud class action settlements during the 1990s.
Although our follow-up surveys indicate that the respondent institutions believe
that they are adequately responding to this problem—and we see some positive
developments in the marketplace with the formation of several third-party
independent monitoring services—we think that there is still room for
improvements in the process.
We recommend that the courts mandate the creation of a centralized
information website about securities fraud class action settlements and that they
standardize claims forms and informational requirements for perfecting a claim.
We think that institutions can do a better job of monitoring claims filing,
especially after the creation of a centralized information source. Finally, we call
on the SEC to strengthen its requirements for Form 13F filing and
dissemination to make this information more transparent and accessible.

90. If this logic did apply, then presumably fiduciaries would no longer need to devote
time and resources to foreclosing on loan collateral when borrowers default, to filing claims
in bankruptcy, or to recouping fee payments to fund managers when they are not made
unless “big money” is involved. At the same time, it is important to remember that
fiduciaries only have a duty to file cost-justified claims.

